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THE IMPRINT OF KOSOVO ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Diane F. Orentlicher*
In several respects, international responses to recent developments in
Kosovo have had a significant-in some respects, profound-impact on
international law. While that impact has been especially notable with respect
to the law governing humanitarian intervention, responses to the Kosovo crisis
have important implications for other areas of international law as well.
But, if recent developments vis-A-vis Kosovo have had a significant impact
on international law, their implications remain unclear and can be assessed only
in highly tentative terms. This is notably the case with respect to the law
governing self-determination. Not until the final status of Kosovo is resolved
will it be possible to even characterize the precedent established. Even so,
responses to Kosovars' claim for independence bring into sharp relief a
potentially profound, if subtle, evolution in the law governing separatist claims.
Contemporary challenges to bedrock principles of international law are
reflected in the Security Council resolution establishing the terms of Kosovo's
post-war governance, SC Resolution 1244 (1999).' That resolution includes a
talismanic nod to time-honored principles of territorial sovereignty-and
proceeds to eviscerate them. While reaffirming "the commitment of all [UN]
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia .... the resolution provides for an "interim [United
Nations] administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,"
pending a final political settlement of Kosovo's status.2
At the risk of oversimplification, developments in the immediate aftermath
of the military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO"), as reflected in SC Resolution 1244, seem to signal an emerging
norm: A state that severely, systematically, and persistently represses the rights
of a segment of its citizens may thereby forfeit the right to exercise full
sovereign authority over that population. But (and here is a crucial qualification), it does not necessarily follow that the oppressed population is entitled to
secede-at least not immediately. Even so, responses to developments in
Kosovo have moved external actors further down the road toward recognizing

I.

Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
SC Res. 1244, 110 (1999).

2.

Id.

*

542

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 6:541

that a presumptive legitimacy may attach to certain types of secessionist claims,
particularly when the population in question has endured persistent, systematic,
and severe repression at the hands of its dejure sovereign.
Before I elaborate, it may be helpful briefly to recall, as a baseline, widely
accepted interpretations of the right of self-determination under international
law. In brief, when the "principle of self-determination," formerly associated
with the redrawing of Europe's borders following World War I, metamorphosed
into a "right," the accepted meaning of "self-determination" also was transformed. It became a right of colonized territories to determine their political
status. The "peoples" who enjoyed a right to secede were defined in territorial
terms, and the territories whose populations could exercise the right of selfdetermination were colonies. Beyond this generally accepted interpretation,
certain developments originating in the inter war period and continuing into the
period of decolonization suggested that groups that were systematically
repressed on a continuing basis: at least groups that were excluded from full
political participation based upon their race and creed: might be entitled to
secede.3 For reasons that need no elaboration, the latter possibility may have
obvious relevance for Kosovars.
In recent years, scholarly views have begun to coalesce around another
additional meaning for the right of self-determination, emphasizing its internal
dimension.4 In multi-ethnic democracies, the rigit has often and increasingly
been invoked to support greater autonomy for defined minorities within
established states.
In an article published last year,5 I argued that these established interpretations may need to make room for a somewhat broader approach to the right of
self-determination, one that reflects contemporary developments in international law first heralded seven years ago in an important article by Thomas
Franck. "Democracy," he wrote, "is on the way to becoming a global
entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective
international processes." Although Professor Franck's article did not examine
3.
Particularly relevant to this interpretation of contemporary international law is the U.N. General
Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8018 (1970). For analysis of the implications of this resolution
for separatist claims, See Antonio Cassese, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 10824(1995).
4.
See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal
Focus? 16 MicH. J. INT'L. L. 733 (1995); Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L.
L. 1, 57-63 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 46 (1992).
5.
Diane F. Orentlicher, SeparationAnxiety: InternationalResponses to Ethno-SeparatistClaims,
23 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1 (1998).
6.
Franck, supra note 3, at 46.
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the significance of this nascent law for separatist movements, I believe that
principles underlying the "democratic entitlement" have substantial implications for the legitimacy of their claims.
To put the case succinctly: Since the core idea of democracy is government by consent of the governed, it cannot be irrelevant to the legitimacy of a
government that a defined portion of its population persistently rejects its
authority to govern them. This much seemed plain to John Stuart Mill.
Affirming that "the question of government ought to be decided by the
governed," Mill continued: "One hardly knows what any division of the human
race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various
collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves." 7
This does not mean that the boundaries of states are perennially open to
challenge. The continuing consent of the state's citizens can generally be
assumed; indeed, this assumption is essential to the daily practice of democracy. But if consent is manifestly and irrevocably absent on the part of a
significant portion of a state's citizens, the legitimacy of that state's sovereignty
over the rebel population is surely placed in doubt.
This point becomes apparent when considered in light of a cardinal rule
of international law: Alien states may not lawfully impose their rule upon nonconsenting peoples. Put differently, international law no longer abides
colonization or forcible annexation. If these forms of non-consensual rule are
incompatible with accepted principles of self-determination, surely those same
principles are at least challenged by a state's continued assertion of sovereignty
over a defined population that has unambiguously and irrevocably rejected its
sovereignty.
This basic point was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada in an
important decision rendered last year. Asked to advise on whether the province
of Quebec could unilaterally secede from Canada, the Court concluded that,
because Canada's political institutions "are premised on the democratic
principle," an expression of the democratic will of Quebecois to secede would
confer legitimacy on their quest: although not a right to secede unilaterally.'
Instead, Canada's other provinces would be obliged to enter into good faith
negotiations over Quebec's status. What is noteworthy about this decision is
the Court's concession that a region's democratically expressed will to secede
obliges its national partners to take the claim seriously.

7.
John Stuart Mill, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOvERNMENT (1861), in
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 392 (Everyman's ed.
1993).
8.
In the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act (Reference re Secession of Quebec),
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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Turning to Kosovo, at the proverbial first blush it is difficult to discern a
similar approach in the responses of states that attempted to broker a solution
to the Kosovo crisis, including the United States. Throughout its failed efforts
to secure-a negotiated resolution of the crisis in the months preceding NATO's
intervention, the United States made clear its unwillingness to endorse the
claims of Kosovar separatists.
In even stronger terms, the Administration of then-United States President
George Bush opposed in the early 1990s the secessionist claims of Slovenia and
Croatia, the first of the former Yugoslavia's republics to proclaim independence. Some eight months after Slovenia made its first formal move toward
secession, the United States as well as European states voiced strong support
for Yugoslav unity. During a visit to Belgrade in mid-1991, then Secretary of
State James Baker warned that the breakup of Yugoslavia "could have some
very tragic consequences." Nor, he added, would the United States recognize
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia "under any circumstances." 9
Against this background, little-noted remarks of President Clinton during
a visit to the capital of Slovenia in the immediate aftermath of NATO's victory
take on special significance. Remarkably in light of United States policy at the
time Slovenia sought to secede from the former Yugoslavia, President Clinton
hailed the success of Slovenia's brief war of independence. "Eight years ago,"
he said, "Mr. Milogevid triggered a military assault on your nation. But you
resisted. You secured your freedom, and you proclaimed that it would never
be the same again. Now, all the people, all the people of every part of Europe
must be able to do the same thing."'0
Although ostensibly addressing Slovenia rather than Kosovo, President
Clinton's remarks in Ljubljana, coming a scant week and a half after NATO's
victory in its war against Yugoslavia over Serbia's conduct in Kosovo, has to
be seen as a statement of the principles thought to have been defended by
NATO's intervention. But what principles, precisely, did President Clinton
have in mind?
Here, again, we are thrown back upon the ambiguities of developments
whose final outcome is not yet known. Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that President Clinton's remarks expressed an implied claim--that
Slovenia's secession from a non-democratic state was supported by
internationally-recognized principles of democracy and personal liberty."
9.
Quoted in the Talk of the Town, NEw YORKER, Aug. 12, 1991, at 21.
10.
William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the People of Ljubljana, June 21, 1999, reprintedin
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DoCumEiNrs, June 24, 1999 Vol. 35, No. 25, pp. 1165-66
[hereinafter Clinton's Remarks in Ljubljana].
11.
I do not believe that this is the sole implication of President Clinton's remarks to the Slovenians
assembled to greet him in Ljubljana. Other aspects of his brief speech seemed to emphasize the nature of the
democracy that Slovenia had established (as distinguished from the independence it had secured). For
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Recalling "how many armies have marched through this square, how many
flags have been raised over your city," President Clinton continued, "Now, at
last, the flag flying in this capital stands for independence and democracy and
the better life you are building. Congratulations, and God bless you.' 12 By
implicitly linking Slovenia' s quest for independence to democratic principles,
President Clinton's remarks in Ljubljana seem to partake of the same spirit as
the position sketched out by Canada's Supreme Court one year ago.
It remains to be noted that these signposts of an emerging approach toward
separatist claims-an approach that recognizes the relevance of democratic
principles in legitimizing at least some of those claims - raise a raft of vexing
questions. If democratic principles are relevant to the claims of breakaway
republics, what precisely are their implications? Would President Clinton have
hailed Slovenia's successful bid for independence in terms of democratic
principles if the rump Yugoslavia had not been associated with campaigns of
"ethnic cleansing" and military force?
Returning to the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court does the
legitimacy of a separatist movement turn upon whether its claim is expressed
through democratic processes? To the extent that the Court's views rested upon
what it saw as a duty on the part of all relevant actors to negotiate with each
other in good faith, what would that Court counsel if one party refused to
negotiate in good faith--or at all?
CONCLUSION

The complexity of these issues and the profound dilemmas they present
once again highlight the importance of early intervention in addressing crises
that might lead toward separation, perhaps violently, if not addressed in a
timely and effective fashion. The implications of the emerging norms I have
sketched in this essay are sobering indeed. Surely, we must be deeply unsettled
by the specter that aspiring statelets such as Kosovo, and perhaps Montenegro
next, may effectively be compelled to withdraw from their former sovereign in
order to secure fundamental rights.

example, immediately following the remarks quoted infra at text accompanying note 2,President Clinton
said: "All over the world, people seek the same kind of freedom and justice and peace that you have brought
here - from Northern Ireland to the Middle East, to southern Africa, and in central and southeastern
Europe." In a similar vein, after congratulating Slovenians for "resist[ing]... Mr. Milolevid ['s] ...military
assault on [their] nation," President Clinton continued: "Democracy, tolerance, and human rights must
prevail everywhere." The focus on the nature of Slovenia's democracy reflected in these remarks does not,
however, detract from the inference that the statements quoted in the text express support - if only
retrospectively - for Slovenia's quest for independence from the former Yugoslavia.
12.
Clinton's Remarks in Ljubljana, supra note 10.

